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Abstract-While the mechanism and scope of cyberspace is 
progressing on a daily basis, risk factors and the ability to process 
cyberspace data in less time and using less effort are proving to be 
major roadblocks to achieve the desired outcomes. The defensive 
methods currently applied to counter these evolving attacks are 
not sufficient due to their preventive and reactive nature so an 
active posture is required. The passive natures of existing 
Situational Awareness (SA) models imply that they cannot 
enhance cyber SA in a world where there are new developments 
every day. The research activity in this paper focused on defining 
a new approach towards ensuring cyber security. We propose an 
Active Situational Awareness Model (ASAM) as a theoretical 
model that enhances the quality of cyber situational awareness. 
The model proposes a concept that conforms to the military 
stratagems of Sun Tzu, where operators always engage attackers 
directly by deploying active intelligence-gathering techniques in 
order to create new knowledge. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The growth in technology has come with its fair share of 
challenges. One of the major challenges are cyber security 
threats, which have become a reality where criminal and terrorist 
activities are orchestrated across the globe [1]. Cyber threats, 
including, but are not limited to, fraud, identity theft, stealing 
corporate business secrets and cyber bullying [2]. Conversely, it 
can be concluded that in terms of technology cyber security is 
one of the major concerns in the modern world which calls for 
implementing measures to ensure safety. 
Considering that the best defense is a strong offense, many 
countries have adopted this offensive strategy in order to deny 
criminal or terrorist forces in their attempts to control or use the 
Internet for their own illegal purposes through the creation of 
good botnets [3]. An active defense involves constant patrolling 
in cyberspace, in order detect, deny, pursue and deactivate 
websites, malicious software and other cyber agents owned by 
those with criminal and/or terrorist intentions [4]. In addition, 
patrolling provides more accurate information about future 
threats, including their source, resources and architecture. This 
information can enable an organization to upgrade its 
intelligence system to a higher level. In turn, this makes the 
organization far more capable of detecting attacks within the 
network including security credentials that have been 
compromised or data that has been stolen or destroyed [5]. 
This paper explores the state-of-the-art of Cyber Situational 
Awareness by investigating the existing situational awareness 
models and identifies their limitations when applied in the cyber 
domain. The main goal of this paper is to introduce a new 
theoretical framework that shapes an Active cyber SA model 
aimed to enhance cyber SA. In the next section we will 
investigate the existing Situational Awareness models and 
identify their limitations when applied in the cyber domain. 
Following, we will define a new active Situational Awareness 
model, in contrast to the existing passive models, which is in line 
with the military philosophy and strategies of Sun Tzu. Finally, 
we will discuss the potential drawbacks and the areas of research 
available when this model is applied in real-case scenarios. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Situational Awareness refers to the acquiring of knowledge 
about the environment and events occurring around us [6]. As a 
concept, SA has been extensively used in military combat 
operations for a long time [7]. As an area of research, its origins 
can be traced back to the theory of military grouping with the 
NCW [8], when research in military aviation security helped 
design computer boundaries for individual operators [9]. 
In the ICT industry, Situational Awareness is a more 
complex concept. It is defined as the capacity to swiftly and 
efficiently address arriving stimuli with appropriate responses 
[1O]. Considering the ICT dimension it is also referred to as 
Cyber Situation Awareness and it has become an ever-evolving 
field of interest. Denning's [11] pioneering work on using expert 
systems to detect computer attacks is marked as the beginning 
of Cyber SA. This seminal work was followed by a plethora of 
experiments covering areas such as anomaly detection, pattern 
matching, and agent-based systems [12]. The early stages of 
these experiments shaped the concept of data fusion, which was 
proposed in the JDL model [13]. As one of the first and most 
influential model in data fusion [14], the JDL model focuses 
solely on data management for preventing cyber-attacks. 
The JDL model incorporates five levels for fusion 
methodologies including level O for preprocessing, level 1 for 
object refinement, level 2 for situation refinement, level 3 for 
threat refinement, and level 4 for process refinement. The stream 
of data enters the model at level O, which provides physical 
access to the raw bits or signal. Based on signal level data 
association and characterization, the model estimates the 
existence of an object. The objects are correlated and tagged in 
order to perform object identification during level 1 processing. 
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In an attempt to understand the current situation, the knowledge 
of objects, their characteristics and relationships with each other 
are aggregated during level 2 processing. Following, the 
assessment of the impact of the given situation proceed at level 
3. The impact estimate includes likelihood estimates and 
cost/utility measures associated with the potential outcomes of a 
player's planned actions. Finally, the last level provides a 
feedback mechanism to the other layers, including the sensor 
itself. In the revised JDL model [15], level 4 process refinement 
might include both the user and sensor control functions as 
feedback for refining the fusion process. 
The main significance of the JDL model for SA lies in the 
fact that the model highlighted the importance of algorithmic 
techniques in support of situation awareness [16]. Nevertheless, 
even though the JDL model was developed to define the fusion 
process it is useful only for automatic processing of a machine 
and does not account for human processing. As a solution, 
Blasch & Plano [17] proposed an additional level to this model, 
level 5 for user refinement in order to delineate the human from 
the machine in process refinement. Dasarathy [18] introduced 
the fusion-focused Data-Feature-Decision (DFD) model to 
guide a machine to make decisions based on data. In the 
Omnibus model [19], which acts as an extension of the OODA 
control loop, the machine is central to the model and is based on 
a human reasoning strategy. 
Cyber situational awareness refers to knowledge about 
ongoing events in the cyber environment making human 
elements significantly important in the process of achieving 
quality. As the JDL model does not model the data fusion 
process from a human perspective, Endsley [2O] proposed a 
model that consolidated the theoretical perspective of SA by 
adding human factors. This model consists of two main parts, 
where the first part is considered as the core of SA, while the 
second part deals with the various factors affecting SA. 
The core portion introduces the three levels of mental 
representation in SA: perception, comprehension, and 
projection. On level 1, perception provides information about 
the status, attributes and dynamics of the relevant elements in 
the environment. The perception of important information 
appears fundamental in the correct visualization of the occurring 
situation [21] and provides the basic building blocks for the 
following levels. This claim is supported by the finding that 76% 
of SA errors made by the pilots stemmed from lack of perception 
of the required information [22]. On level 2, comprehension 
refers to an outcome relating to how people interpret, associate, 
store and retain information. This includes the integration of 
multiple pieces of information and a determination of their 
relevance to the underlying goals in order to produce a 
composite picture of the evolving situation. In the previously 
mentioned study, lack of comprehension was a cause of 2O% of 
pilot error. Projection, placed on level 3, helps decision-makers 
with the highest level of SA, to forecast the occurrence of 
situational events and their progression dynamics. The second 
part of Endsley's model presents an elaborate and detailed 
description of the various factors affecting SA such as elements, 
time and space. Nevertheless, a successful fusion system must 
address the entire process which includes data acquisition, 
awareness, prediction and the ability to request elaboration or 
additional data. For this reason, the Endsley's model has been 
extended to a fourth level, Resolution, which provides 
awareness of the best path to follow to achieve the desired 
outcome to the situation [23]. 
Endsley's model is a purely cognitive theory which not only 
depends on information flow, but also does not consider 
technological factors. As such, the model is too abstract and 
doesn't state how SA is achieved in detail, making it insufficient 
for cyber security. In the perceptual cycle model [24] and the 
activity theory model [25], the psychological approach to SA is 
different, nevertheless all of the models are still defined as 
constricting parallel processes. Tadda [26] identifies the JDL 
model as a bottom-up, data-driven functional model, and the 
Endsley's model as a top-down, goal-driven mental model. He 
correctly recognized the value of both approaches, and proposed 
a combined model. In his SA model the levels of the JDL model 
are initially split into two different processes. Levels O (data 
acquisition) and level 1 (object correlation), are treated as a 
single process by defining the objects structures within the 
object's identification modules. Levels 2 and 3, have been 
placed into another process devoted solely to situation 
assessment. 
Functionally, this model contains the best elements of both 
JDL and Endsley's models, with some additional items such as 
initial data requirement and textual input. This combined SA 
model defines the problem/goal in a top-down manner through 
a so-called processing flow solution, where actions such as 
projection (alerts), comprehension (model analysis), perception 
(data collection), parsing/extraction and data cleansing take 
place. Following, process refinement deals with missing data, 
additional data and input for sensor management until the model 
reaches the process of offline-processing which involves 
knowledge discovery. The model uses three broad areas of 
operation: perception, comprehension, and anticipation, which 
can be applied to cyber SA. Evidence is collected at the 
perception level, on the comprehension level the situation is 
understood by recognizing intrusion attempts and exploiting a 
priori knowledge, which in turn would enable the anticipation of 
the possible magnitude of impact [27]. 
Tadda himself identifies the main weakness in his model in 
the difficulty to determine possible futures. At level 2 the 
prevention of an actual attack falls short simply because the 
knowledge of the defender is less than the knowledge of the 
attacker. This diminished knowledge occurs because in Tadda's 
model data is only captured from local networks and not 
cyberspace. Cyber Situational Awareness must consider the 
other effects of a cyber-attack, beyond network data. Local 
network monitoring can never detect zero day attacks, therefore 
it is necessary to obtain intelligence on the enemy network as 
well. 
III. ACTIVE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS MODEL 
All of the current SA models show a preference for a 
defensive posture when it comes to deterring cyber-attacks. 
They influence the operator to process and utilize knowledge 
only within the concept of attack prevention which creates a 
defensive mindset. An attitude of only blocking the attackers is 
never sufficient to win the situation; instead, it motivates 
enemies to become more innovative and produce new and 
creative ways of attack. Conversely, the models suffer from 
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uncertainty because their focus on self-awareness confines their 
activities within the host domain as new knowledge is always 
required in order to prevent an attack [28]. The following section 
of this paper presents a modeling strategy with a proactive 
approach towards Situational Awareness. This model is strongly 
influenced by Sun Tzu's military strategy and the dynamics of 
an offensive posture to deter cyber-attacks. 
A. Theoretical Framework 
A classic passive cyber network defense is composed of 
multiple niche intrusion detection tools, such as password 
protection, data encryption and firewalls, which carry out 
network data analysis and produce unique alerting outputs [29]. 
The passive pre-defined techniques that, for example, disable an 
account or notify an administrator, are inadequate in the sense 
that hackers devise techniques to circumvent these measures and 
launch successful attacks [3O]. In contrast, an active defense 
comprises measures originated by the defender against the 
attacker, which will not only prevent attacks in progress, but 
would ideally make it difficult for the attacker to launch more 
attacks. Active SA and active defense techniques can be divided 
into three categories: 
• Counterattack - conducted against the attacker's 
information system during or immediately after the 
initial attack. 
• Pre-emptive attack - aimed at the enemy's 
information system infrastructure, it is designed in 
such a way that it will deter the enemy from 
launching effective attacks against the network 
systems. 
• Active deception - uses the momentum of the 
attack to defeat it by channeling an attack away 
from the defender's information scheme and into a 
parallel dummy system. 
With this in mind and considering the previously reviewed 
literature, a theoretical framework for active Situational 
Awareness should consider the following points. 
1. The cyber commander should possess an offensive 
attitude/mindset towards all cyber-attacks. 
2. The offensive attitude should encourage the 
operator to decisively create new knowledge. 
3. The cyber commander should create and exploit the 
acquired new knowledge through an appropriate 
active SA model to enable the operator to exploit 
multi-domain ambience, invade attackers' 
domains, and apply deception tactics. 
4. The aggressive strategy should defeat the attackers 
before they can resort to any harmful operation 
within the operator's domain. 
5. The operator should be able to achieve the desired 
outcome, i.e., manage, retain and improve the 
desired cyber operations. 
B. Compact Theoretical Model 
Organizations dealing with sensitive data relating to one or 
more infrastructures of national importance cannot afford to wait 
for an attack incident to occur and then react. Therefore, within 
the previously discussed theoretical framework, an active SA 
model needs to complement the winning attitude and enable the 
cyber commander to employ an appropriate defensive technique 
in a multi-domain environment. 
Within this context, the tasks of the Active SA Model 
(ASAM) proposed in this study can be framed as follows: 
• ASAM will interact with adversaries; 
• ASAM will be activated once an attack gets 
redirected; 
• ASAM will use deception by redirecting the 
attacker to a deception server; 
• ASAM will use spyware, to control the adversaries 
and to get into their domain; 
• ASAM will influence the enemy through 
deception, which will affect their own SA. 
These tasks highlight the role of intelligence as creation and 
application of new knowledge. The new knowledge generated 
by ASAM would act as a force multiplier helping us to narrow 
down the role of ASAM in a compact theoretical model. 
C. Alignment with Sun Tzu’s Strategies 
The role of intelligence is extremely crucial in the ASAM 
model since new knowledge will form the basis of a counter 
action. In addition, the model needs to be continually updated 
with knowledge about the capabilities, resources, plans and 
motives of the potential attackers. The existing literature offers 
no solution within this context, except for the concept put 
forward by Sun Tzu [31], which specifically focuses on how the 
intelligence of one party can be used to defeat the other. His 
strategy is applicable in cyber situation since it covers all 
possible situations, especially when the issue of intelligence is 
involved. The integration of networks takes place in the mind of 
the commander, but by deception in cyberspace, the mind of the 
commander can be attacked [32]. Hence, in a cyber war, 
commanders should direct their intelligence operations towards 
gathering information that will deny cyber attackers from 
achieving their purpose. Considering the gravity of the threat to 
cyber security, the proposed ASAM will integrate military 
philosophy in its structure and mechanism by utilizing 13 
military recommendations from Sun Tzu's Art of War (AoW) 
under four categories. These categories, initiation, direction, 
action, and exploitation, will shape the process of active defense. 
1) Initiation 
During Initiation ASAM allows the commander to deal with 
basic knowledge in order to formulate the basic course of action 
by utilizing Sun Tzu's AoW I (Laying Plans) and AoW IV 
(Tactical Dispositions). According to AoW I, good leaders not 
only exploit flawed plans, but also exploit flawed adversaries 
[31], [33]. Furthermore, the interpretation of AoW IV from the 
perspective of a cyber war suggests that the primary challenge 
in cyber warfare is to know whether the system is under attack, 
and therefore the short-term cyber defense goal should be to 
improve an organization's ability to collect, evaluate and 
transmit digital evidence [34]. 
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Considering that both AoW's accent the importance of 
gathering appropriate inputs about the enemy, the four variables 
important for this category are: enemy identity, enemy location, 
enemy motive and enemy goal. These will establish the 
fundamental knowledge which the commander cannot do 
without. Accordingly, the activities that fall under this category 
involve the use of passive intelligence, where security alerts 
would send tacit knowledge that could be converted into explicit 
knowledge by virtue of intelligence gathering. 
2) Direction 
Besides understanding the magnitude of the enemy's 
strength, in this phase, ASAM would develop a detailed plan. 
The model will utilize AoW IX (Army on the March) and AoW 
X (Terrain). In accordance with AoW IX, cyber commanders 
need to check all nuances of the system while counter attacking 
the enemy, while simultaneously remembering that attackers can 
also apply deception [31]. AoW X suggests that cyberspace 
contains more dangers than the real world, since terrestrial 
distance does not play a role in a network. Hence, it will be 
necessary to apply meticulous pre-operational cyber-attack 
planning in order to manage the cyber terrain [33]. 
These AoWs stress the importance of gauging the enemy 
from all sides, creating three variables of importance, Enemy 
Capability, Enemy Weakness and Possible Impact of Enemy 
Attack. Accordingly, the activities within this category would 
involve the use of the Explicit Knowledge acquired from 
activities during Initiation. 
3) Action 
Action is the most elaborate phase of the model as 
commanders launch an attack on a cyber explorer who has 
already been tracked down as a potential threat. At this stage the 
ASAM would allow commanders to utilize AoW II (Waging 
War), AoW III (Attack by Stratagem), AoW V (Energy), AoW 
VI (Weak and Strong Points), AoW VII (Maneuvering), AoW 
VIII (Variation in Tactics) and AoW XI (Nine Situations). 
AoW II. To ensure the safety of the domain, the cyber 
commander would collect the credentials and privileges of the 
enemy without disclosing this action to the enemy [35], [36]. 
AoW III. When the cyber-attack involves the IT 
infrastructure the commander needs to secure victory before 
combat is even necessary [31]. 
AoW V. In a win-or-perish situation the enemy might focus 
all available power and skill to outmaneuver the commander. 
Therefore, the commander must remain one step ahead and 
attack the opponent at the most opportune moment [34]. 
AoW VI. The commander will make all cyber 
reconnaissance tasks difficult and confusing to the enemy, in 
order to prevent the enemy from developing an effective strategy 
[31]. 
AoW VII. The commander will deceive the enemy through 
misinformation before going for the final decisive attack [33]. 
AoW VIII. The commander will treat every combat as a new 
situation and approach it with alacrity, disregarding the potential 
complacency from earlier success [31]. 
AoW XI. The commander will monitor all nuances of the 
system while counter-attacking the enemy [31]. 
The above suggestions would lead the commander to deal 
with three variables in this category, which are Timing of 
Attack, Consistency of Action and Variation in Action. 
Accordingly, the activities within this category would contribute 
to the commander's intelligence, which in turn would expand 
the possibilities for exploiting the enemy. 
4) Exploitation 
In Exploitation, ASAM would work on exploiting the enemy 
in order to extract more knowledge about the motives and goals 
behind the attack. Here, ASAM would utilize AoW XII (Attack 
by Fire) and AoW XIII (Use of Spies). AoW XII suggests that 
the commander should annihilate the enemy, while AoW XIII 
suggests using spies to get more information in such a situation. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Detailed Theoretical Active Situational Awareness Model 
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This would lead the commander to deal with two variables: 
Knowledge Collection and Demolition. Knowledge Collection 
and Demolition can work in tandem in order to enable the 
commander to launch both offensive and deception activities. 
D. Detailed Theoretical Active Situational Awareness Model 
Considering all of the aspects discussed so far the enhanced 
theoretical model of ASAM is presented in Figure 1. 
In this model, the three major components inherited from the 
passive SA models, perception, comprehension and projection, 
would depend on the qualities of several factors. The quality 
level of perception would depend on the quality level of 
intelligence, while the quality of intelligence would depend on 
the qualities of correctness and completeness. In the same 
fashion, the quality level of comprehension would depend on the 
quality levels of previous knowledge, skills and experience, 
analytical ability and confidence. Finally, the quality of 
projection would depend on the intent, i.e. the desired outcome. 
In order to effectively enhance situational awareness, ASAM 
has to be implemented via a specific process carried out in three 
major steps. The first step is the alert stage which is noted 
through passive action [37]. This aims at procuring relevant 
information such as the attacker's identity, motive, location, 
goal, capability, weakness and impact. The second step is high 
level interaction, where the enemy domain is actively attacked. 
Potential information that can be discovered includes the 
attacker's operating system, opened ports and active services 
[38]. This identifies the weaknesses of the attacker's domain and 
provides the necessary information for countering the attack 
[39]. In the last step of the process, resource database 
mobilization, the active domain is prepared to counter the attack. 
The identified vulnerabilities are patched and the necessary 
protective measures which would ensure that the domain 
remains safe and impenetrable to the attackers are activated. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The threats of cyber-attacks are always evolving. Cyber 
incidents can happen in a fraction of second, and therefore it is 
necessary to have an agile response to deter attacks and defend 
computer networks. This paper has identified and explained the 
variables of the new, enhanced SA model, where intelligence 
factors directly impact SA. The enhanced Situational Awareness 
in this model is achieved by utilizing an offensive capability 
which allows defenders to interact with suspected attackers in 
order to gain new knowledge. This approach makes active 
intelligence a critical component of the enhanced SA model, as 
it has been argued that passiveness in cyber security is 
inadequate [26]. The cumulative power of active intelligence in 
ASAM would greatly enhance SA, which in turn would help the 
commander to confront and defeat the potential enemy. 
Arguably, one of the main questions that might arise for the 
proposed model is how ASAM could perform so many tasks. As 
discussed previously the main driving force of ASAM is 
intelligence generated from new knowledge gathered from the 
adversary domain. With this knowledge the commander can 
operate with enhanced ability to deter cyber-attacks since it is 
consistent with military doctrine. A continuous flow of 
intelligence would give the upper hand to the operator dealing 
with security threats even before their occurrence. For example, 
ASAM could influence the attacker by exploiting the OODA 
loop [4O], where the central tenet, stemming from a military 
perspective, is to defeat the adversary strategically, by 
psychological paralysis [2]. 
On its own, Situational Awareness is a combination of 
perception, comprehension and projection. Researchers have 
discussed how information feeds into perception; however, they 
have not been clear about what to perceive (Endsley, 1995; 
Tadda, 2OO8). Tadda's model provides some basic information 
about data-gathering and the importance of intelligence feeding 
at level O of his model, but does not explicitly cover what 
information is to be gathered. The current passive SA models 
relay only the information that comes from the local domain, 
while on the other end of the spectrum, the core of the proposed 
ASAM in this paper is the active intelligence factor. In ASAM, 
this active intelligence comes from previous knowledge or 
experience regarding cyber incidents, risk assessments of cyber 
resources, politics or deception, whereas adversaries can be 
channeled into manageable or controlled cyber resources for the 
purpose of gathering intelligence. Conversely, ASAM integrates 
the principal factors that allow measurement of the performance 
of cyber commanders' SA, since cyber incidents require an agile 
SA that exploits quality active intelligence when dealing with 
cyber-attacks. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The theoretical findings in this research identify the set of 
actions proposed by ASAM as most adequate for cyber security 
due to its active, offensive nature. Unlike other models, ASAM 
helps in gathering highly accurate intelligence attained 
offensively by hacking the enemy's domain. As such the gather 
intelligence has all the desired characteristics of cyber 
intelligence: accuracy, completeness, timeliness and reliability. 
Consequently, the decisions made with regard to the data are 
well informed, and the protective measures derived from this 
information are precise and customized to counter specific 
enemy attacks. 
Nevertheless, ASAM still requires the rigors of evaluation 
through real-time laboratory testing on a cyber range to prove its 
efficacy and effectiveness. Current SA models have no 
mechanisms that allow us to assess the advantages of a particular 
model. Therefore, it is very important to have a measurement 
factor that determines how good is the personnel SA by 
measuring the quality of their SA and their agility in achieving 
it. Enhanced SA can be measured by using quality and agility 
variables to determine how good the SA performance is, which 
is critical to SA evaluation. In future research we plan to identify 
the variables necessary to develop a framework for assessing 
SA. We would then use these variables to test the utility of the 
proposed ASAM in practice using the cyber range in a Serious 
Gaming Experiment. This approach to SA evaluation will not 
only serve to evaluate whether ASAM enhances SA, but also 
provide the means to directly measure SA performance in order 
to determine SA Training. 
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